Q:  For the fourth issue presented (whether the harm to the plaintiffs is "sufficiently concrete" to prove standing), are you asking us to limit our analysis to the injury prong of standing, or are you asking us to address whether the plaintiffs have standing, particularly in light of their unusual injuries?
A:  Regarding your question, the court directive is clear.  Answer the question however you best see fit. 

Q: I understand that we can choose which side to represent in our brief, and I want to clarify the party choices.  Are the options as follows?   (1) Province of Inuksuk, (2) Village of Akuli, (3) Genergy Corp., Atomic Energy, Inc., Centennial Power Co., Power Suppliers Co., and First Energy, Ltd. & (4) Stephen Johnson, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 
A: There are three sides: 1) the village & province, 2) EPA and 3) industry.

Q: We have one question regarding the problem.  On page 1 of the problem, it says that the plaintiffs base their suit on federal common law of nuisance or alternatively on New Union's law of nuisance.  Since the district court opinion doesn't address the state law claims, are we to assume that those were dismissed along with the federal claim? Or did the defendants not move for summary judgment on that claim? 
A: If you are suggesting that there were pendant state claims, that is not in the fact pattern.

Q: Question number 2 asks whether it is appropriate to apply the Landers rule under either the federal or state law. The state adopted the third restatement and the third restatement of torts for the indivisible harm of independent tortfeasors (REST 3d TORTS-AL s 17) refers back to the local law of the jurisdiction. Are we to assume that the state will apply some other law (this seems rather circular)? Also, if there is a local state law then it must be applied because a federal court in diversity must apply the law of the state in which it sits. So are we just trying to look at the Landers Rule in general, because based on Erie the court would have to apply the state common law for the public nuisance claim.
A: You should deal with the law and the facts as any litigant would.

Q:  The titles of the case in question 1 [Illinois v. Milwaukee] doesn't match the citation [451 US 304 (1981)].  Is the problem referring to the citation or the case name?
A:  The case is Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).  The parties were reversed.

Q: The decision from the district court held that the plaintiffs' harm was too speculative under the public nuisance law of the State of New Union which follows the Restatement (3d) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability.  There was no citation to a section in the problem and the Apportionment of Liability in the Third Restatement does not have specific section devoted to public nuisance.  Is the problem referring to section 26 (Apportionment of Liability When Damages Can be Divided by Causation)?
A: Regarding the Restatement, the state follows the appropriate provisions of Restatement 3d.

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Q: The order of the District Court states that "the public nuisance law of New Union ... follows the Restatement of the Law Third, Torts: Apportionment of Liability."  Should we assume that, other than apportionment of liability, the public nuisance law of New Union follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts?
A: The opinion is silent on the nuisance law of New Union, other than whatever is covered in Restatement Third: Apportionment.

Q1: On the issue of concreteness for standing, is concreteness the only aspect of standing that we are supposed to address, or are we supposed to address all of the standing arguments that may tie into concreteness indirectly (those which are argued by EPA and private power companies in the trial court opinion)?  
Q2: In briefing issue number four, is the concreteness of plaintiffs' standing under the injury-in-fact requirement the only element of standing we are to address?
A: The Court has asked whether the harm is concrete.  Litigants can make whatever arguments they deem appropriate in that regard.

Q: If we were to write our brief as the EPA, on the issues that are about the claims against the defendant power companies, do we take a position that is similar to that of an intervenor? For example, issues 1-3 deal with the nuisance claim against the power companies, and although the EPA is not defending those claims, the EPA still argues a position based on what it believes to be the correct law. Is that correct?
A: The record indicates the positions each of the parties have taken on the issues. 

Q: On issue 5, since the question of whether greenhouse gases are air pollutants under the Clean Air Act is not being argued, is it correct to assume that EPA's authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions (under section 115) is also not being argued in this problem?
A: No.

Q1: Is it acceptable to use scientific evidence outside what has been provided in the record? (For example, as representatives of the companies, are we allowed to refute certain conclusions about global warming based on scientific studies mentioned in law review articles or other secondary resources?)
Q2: Is there any evidence in the record about global climate patterns and the likelihood that the CO2 in the atmosphere over New Union more directly causes harm to plaintiffs than CO 2 emissions from anywhere else on the continent or globe?
A: The facts of this particular case are those found by the court below and reflected in the record.  However in making arguments litigants may undertake whatever research they think appropriate and rely on authorities such as books, treatises, articles and other sources of information to support those arguments. 

Q: The problem refers to the "Arctic Climate Impact Assessment" by the International Climate Change Research Panel.  Is this Assessment meant to be hypothetical or is it referring to the real Assessment done by the Arctic Council and the International Arctic Science Committee?
A: The ICCRP is a fictitious organization, which issued a fictitious report. 

Q: We understand that no case law from after September 1, 2006 can be used, but can we cite relevant literature published after September 1, 2006, such as the recent U.K. Stern Report on the economics of climate change?
A: The problem only restricts the use of case law after September 1. 

Q: Do we need to address general administrative law issues, such as the standard of review, even though these are not explicitly stated as issues to be briefed in the problem?
A: These are not issues that the court directed be addressed, but if you feel it is necessary to address them for your arguments that is your decision.

Q: What is the expectation for use of cases that are not mentioned in the problem?  Is there a minimum or maximum amount of case law expected to be included in addressing the briefing question?
A: There are no expectations in this regard.

Q: In briefing issue number three, are we to assume that the precautionary principle is customary international law?
A: We cannot help you on this.